Password rules: Change them every 25 years
While there certainly are parts of the password rules - like length, complex syntax, special characters, etc - that indeed may contribute to improving password security, the often stated requirement to change passwords every 90 days has far less obvious benefits.
There are four basic ways for a bad guy to get your password:
(a) Ask for it. So-called "Phishing" and "Social Engineering" attacks still work, and always will
(b) Try dictionary words at the login prompt in the hope to get lucky ("Brute Force")
(c) Obtain the encryped/hashed password somehow, and crack it
(d) Leech the password off your computer with keylogger malware
None of these four scenarios becomes less likely if you change your password every 90 days. If the bad guy can't break the password hash (c) within a couple days, he'll likely just look for an easier target. Attack (b) is also out for quick wins - either it works within the first couple dozen passwords tried, or the bad guy moves on to easier prey. If (b) or (c) are successful, or the attacker already has the password through (a) or (d), 45 days on average is more than enough to empty out your bank account or use your email address for a big spam run.
The concept of password expiry remained the same for the last 25 years or so. Infosec professionals, auditors, PCI, ISO27002, COBIT, etc all keep requiring it, unchanged, even though the threats have changed quite a bit. Forcing a user who had a weak password to change it will just make him pick another weak one. Forcing a user who had a very strong password to change it will eventually annoy the user into using simpler passwords.
So what gives? There is one practical benefit. If someone has your password, and all they want is to read your email and remain undetected, they can do so forever, unless you eventually change your sign-in secret. Thus, regularly changing the password doesn't help much against someone breaking in and making it off with your goods, but it DOES give you a chance to shake off any stalkers or snoopers you might have accessing your account. Yes, this is good. But whether this benefit alone is worth the hassle and mentioned disadvantages of forcing users to change their password every 90 days, I have my doubts.
Infosec risk management is about identifying threats and vulnerabilities, and then picking a countermeasure. But if the chosen countermeasure doesn't in fact make the identified threats less likely, all we do is play security theater, and the countermeasure is one that we don't need.
Unless, of course, "best practice standards" and audits force us to have it.
Comments
What do you recommend we do in these situations?
Ryan
Nov 2nd 2009
1 decade ago
Link to my article: http://www.gfi.com/blog/security-vs-productivity-in-the-workplace/
Cliff
Nov 2nd 2009
1 decade ago
kevinm
Nov 2nd 2009
1 decade ago
Adam
Nov 2nd 2009
1 decade ago
It's an eye opener to some that even a "strong" password can fall in seconds if it is the first generated by the password cracking tool.
Scott
Nov 2nd 2009
1 decade ago
Mike B
Nov 2nd 2009
1 decade ago
If we were regularly using robust, multi-factor authentication for the majority of our logons, we wouldn't be so focused on frequent password changes.
-ASB: http://xeesm.com/AndrewBaker
ASB
Nov 2nd 2009
1 decade ago
Are there any studies to support the assertion that forced rotation actually leads to weaker passwords? Seems obvious to me, but that's just 'anecdata'. :)
Zandr
Nov 2nd 2009
1 decade ago
Daniel-ISC
Nov 2nd 2009
1 decade ago
What I can't understand is the trend to more frequent password change requirements. 10 years ago, annual password changes were sufficient on many systems. Until recently, 90 days was the standard. Now I'm seeing 60 days, and expect 30 days very soon.
I've never gotten an explanation of what vulnerabilities are present in, e.g. days 61-90 that weren't there on days 1-60. We're just forced to implement shorter password changes. I know from spot checks that shortening password change intervals drives more users to put passwords under keyboards, etc.
Crackers have broken systems which use tokens that change passwords every 5 minutes, using keyboard sniffers and real-time monitoring and exploits. We'll never get password change intervals short enough to mitigate those attacks.
We've gone past the point of diminishing returns on short password change intervals. We should focus on improving controls in other areas, and augmenting or replacing usernames/passwords for authentication.
Rex
Nov 2nd 2009
1 decade ago